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We  consider  a framework  in  which  the optimal  admissions  policy  of  a  purely  academic-
quality  oriented  college  implements  preferential  treatment  in  favor  of the  student  from
the deprived  socioeconomic  background  which  maximizes  the  competition  between  can-
didates.  We  find  that  the  exact  form  of  the  preferential  treatment  admissions  policy  matters
for student  incentives  and  hence  for student-body  diversity  in  equilibrium.  Preferential
treatment  policy  in  college  admissions  often  takes,  or  is  perceived  to take,  an  additive
form  where  the  score  of  the  applicant  from  the  deprived  background  is  augmented  by aeywords:
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ournament
fixed number  of points.  Such  a  preferential  treatment  policy  fails  to incentivize  students
from  the  deprived  background.  Despite  the  affirmative  action,  the  level  of preferential
treatment  that  achieves  academic  excellence  leaves  student-body  diversity  unchanged
compared  with  a background-blind  admissions  policy  and  leads  to a higher  intergroup
score  gap.
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incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare
for the LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving
the requisite score.”
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In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme Court
approved the use of race as a factor in the admissions
decisions of the Law School of the University of Michi-
gan. In practice this landmark ruling leaves the door
open for a holistic socioeconomic background-sighted
admissions policy allowing a less academically qualified
candidate to be preferred. Opponents of preferential treat-
ment admissions policies often claim that students subject
to preferential treatment have less incentive to put in
effort to achieve higher academic quality. Therefore stu-
dents from different backgrounds are more likely to be
polarized in quality which may  aggravate statistical dis-
crimination in the post-college job market. In this paper
we analyze the effect of college admission policies on
effort incentives of students from differing socioeconomic
backgrounds.
The theoretical literature on affirmative action in edu-
cation has grown rapidly since the 1996 California ban on
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color-sighted admissions in public schools.2 The strand of
the literature most closely related to this paper studies how
an academic-quality oriented college may  use affirmative
action admissions policies to increase the expected qual-
ity of the incoming class.3 In an all-pay auction framework
Fu (2006) finds that affirmative action through prefer-
ential treatment creates positive cross-group interaction
between applicants.4 It helps level the playing field induc-
ing candidates from both privileged and underprivileged
backgrounds to invest more heavily in educational attain-
ment. Hence the optimal admissions policy of a purely
academic-quality oriented college gives preferential treat-
ment to the applicant from a disadvantaged background.
Furthermore the college’s objective of academic excel-
lence is in harmony with student-body diversity. The
optimal admissions policy of a purely academic-quality ori-
ented college also yields full student-body diversity as a
byproduct.5
In this paper we adapt Fu (2006) to investigate how the
student effort incentive effects and student-body diversity
depend on the exact form of the policy. Fu (2006) exam-
ines affirmative action policy with a multiplicative form:
the “academic achievement score” of a candidate from an
underprivileged background is multiplied by a constant
greater than one. However, preferential treatment policies
often take an additive form. For example, the undergrad-
uate admissions office of the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Michigan added 20 points (out of 150)
to the underprivileged candidate’s academic achievement
score.6 Espenshade, Chung, and Walling (2004) estimates
that in three academically selective U.S. universities on
average the admissions policies implicitly add 230 extra
2 A number of states have banned affirmative action based on race in
public colleges either by court order, referendum or Governor’s initia-
tive. In addition to California, these include Louisiana (1996), Mississippi
(1996), Texas (1996), Washington (1998), Florida (2000) and Georgia
(2001). Public opinion is divided on the question of affirmative action
with opponents gaining momentum. Affirmative action policy was  a bal-
lot measure in two states in the 2008 U.S. elections. While Colorado voted
for affirmative action (51%), Nebraska voted against it (58%).
3 Another important strand of the literature considers colleges that have
diversity as one of their goals. In these frameworks a ban on color-sighted
admissions policies can lead the college to use less efficient means to
achieve diversity. Examples of this literature include Chan and Eyster
(2003),  Fryer and Loury (2005a, 2005b), Fryer, Loury, and Yuret (2007)
and Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2008).  Hickman (2010) has a sophisticated
alternative approach, looking at the global effect of an arbitrary affirma-
tive  action policy without consideration of an individual college’s goals or
incentives.
4 Franke (2010) shows that the results in Fu (2006) also hold in a frame-
work with a stochastic success function.
5 Furstenberg (2007) considers a college that uses test scores to infer
students’ innate ability. Students with the same innate ability but from dif-
ferent socioeconomic backgrounds differ in their cost of improving their
test  scores. Therefore an academic-quality oriented school has differing
test score cutoffs for white and black students. Nevertheless the qualita-
tive  results are similar to Fu (2006). Affirmative action is used to increase
the  quality of the student body which has the byproduct of increased
student-body diversity compared to a background-blind admissions pol-
icy.
6 The Supreme Court ruled out this rigid scoring practice in Gratz v.
Bollinger (2003). Whether a background sighted admissions policy is offi-
cially announced as a rigid scoring rule or simply perceived by students
as  an additional bonus makes no difference for the purposes of this paper.tion Review 31 (2012) 123– 130
SAT points (on a 1600 scale) to the scores of African Amer-
ican students. In the most selective 20 percent of four-year
U.S. institutions, Kane (1998) finds that being black or His-
panic gives an advantage of approximately 400 SAT points.7
Since affirmative action policies often add or are perceived
to add extra points, we  depart from Fu (2006) by analyzing
an additive form of the preferential treatment admissions
policy.
We find that a purely academic-quality oriented col-
lege implements moderate preferential treatment in favor
of the applicant from a deprived socioeconomic back-
ground. However, the additive preferential treatment that
maximizes expected academic quality leaves the expected
academic achievement of the student from the deprived
background unaltered while the student from the priv-
ileged background puts in more effort to overcome the
handicap. In equilibrium, this simply leads to a higher
score gap between students from different backgrounds
without altering student-body diversity compared with a
background-blind admissions policy.
The differences in the incentive structures of the two
preferential treatment rules lead to the differences in the
implications of the models. A multiplicative preferential
treatment policy increases the marginal benefit of effort
for the student from a disadvantaged background. This
induces greater academic effort on his part and in equi-
librium results in a higher probability of admission. On  the
other hand, an additive affirmative action policy does not
alter the marginal benefit of effort for a underprivileged
candidate. The bonus points are added irrespective of the
performance of the student and so do not incentivize the
student to put in additional effort, as intuitively suggested
by Justice Thomas. Therefore the exact implementation of
the preferential treatment policy, whether multiplicative
or additive, can dramatically alter its effects on student
incentives and equilibrium student-body diversity.
Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium
admissions policy. Section 3 discusses student-body diver-
sity and the intergroup score gap in equilibrium. Section 4
concludes with a summary of the results.
2. The model
There are two  risk-neutral candidates who  compete for
a single seat at a college: a candidate from a privileged
socioeconomic background and a candidate from a deprived
socioeconomic background denoted by P and D, respec-
tively. The timing of the college admissions game is as
follows: the college announces an admissions rule which is
based on the test scores and backgrounds of the applicants.
Candidates then observe the admissions rule and decide on
how much academic effort to put in to prepare for the test.
7 While our discussion and much of the empirical literature focuses on
the case of the U.S., the existence of socioeconomic tiers is not unique to
the  U.S. For instance, in an effort to foster social mobility the National Uni-
versity of Ireland Maynooth adds 50 points (on a 600 point scale) to the
admissions score of students from disadvantaged socioeconomic back-
grounds. NUIM is one of the eight Higher Education Institutions in Ireland
that participates in the Higher Education Access Route Program (HEAR).
See  http://access.nuim.ie/scope/hear.
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heir efforts translate into test scores qP and qD. The college
bserves the test scores and the socioeconomic background
f the applicants and admits one of them following the
reviously announced admissions rule.
.1. The applicants
Each applicant has a valuation of a place in college
enoted by Vi ∈ (0, ∞)  ∀ i ∈ {P, D}. Applicant i’s effective aca-
emic effort ei results in a test score qi via a non-stochastic
ymmetric linear technology qi = ei and the unit cost of
ffective effort is ci. The payoff to applicant i is Vi − ciei
f he is accepted and −ciei if he is rejected. The value-
o-cost ratio is asymmetric where VP/cP > VD/cD. There are
any potential sources for this asymmetry. For instance
tudents from a deprived background may  lack access to
ffective tutorials for the SAT leading to cD > cP.8 There may
lso be inequality in post-college job market opportuni-
ies. Students from a deprived socioeconomic background
ften have less promising job prospects due to factors
ncluding statistical discrimination, lack of social networks
nd/or lack of mainstream business community approved
annerisms, as well as overt discrimination. Poorer post-
ollege job prospects can result in a lower valuation of
he place in college for the student from a deprived back-
round, VD < VP.9 An applicant from a deprived background
ay  find the monetary cost of attending a selective uni-
ersity more onerous, so the value of admission would be
ower for such a candidate, VD < VP.
.2. The college
A purely academic-quality oriented college chooses
ts admissions rule in order to maximize the expected
cademic quality of the admitted student, which is rep-
esented by the expected test score of the incoming
tudent.10 The college can base its admissions policy on
est scores as well as the socioeconomic backgrounds of
he applicants.
We examine admission policies where the college adds
 fixed number of points  ∈ (−∞,  +∞) to the score of
he applicant from the deprived background. The college
dmits Candidate D if qD +  > qP, it admits Candidate P if
D +  < qP, and randomly assigns the seat in case of equal-
ty. If  = 0, the college implements a background-blind
8 Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) argues that among minorities aspiring
o  achieve may be labeled as “acting white” and may be a cause of rejection
rom the social peer group. This would also result in a higher cost of effort
or students from the deprived background.
9 Weinberger and Joy (2007) documents the U.S. racial wage gap among
ollege graduates from 1980 to 2001. Black men  in their 20s and 30s
arned about 15 percent less than white men, while black women earned
bout 25 percent less than white men. After controlling for differences in
amily background, work experience and the type and quality of college
ducation, black men  in the same age group earned 8 percent less and
lack women  earned 15 percent less than white men.
10 Rotthoff (2008) points out that the college may  have the objective
f  producing graduates that are highly employable rather than targeting
cademic quality. Bowen and Bok (1998) suggests that universities may
ave a broad educational attainment objective that includes creating an
nvironment that fosters social integration. In this paper, however, we
ssume that the college cares solely about academic excellence.tion Review 31 (2012) 123– 130 125
admissions policy.11 It is possible to present the results
more concisely if we  define f as the applicant who  is favored
by the admissions policy and u as the applicant who  is unfa-
vored by the policy. If  > 0, the admissions policy favors
students from a deprived background, f = D and u = P. If
 < 0, the college favors the student from the privileged
background f = P and u = D, a policy that is frequently imple-
mented by giving priority to relatives of alumni.12
2.3. The applicants’ equilibrium strategies
Since the cost of academic effort is sunk irrespective of
the identity of the admitted student, the resulting compe-
tition between the candidates for the seat in the college
takes the form of an all-pay auction where the “bids” of
the candidates are their test scores. Hence the model is an
adaptation of the all-pay auction of Konrad (2002) to allow
for asymmetric valuations of the prize and cost of effort.
If preferential treatment is very strong,  ≥ VP/cP or
 ≤ −VD/cD, the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies
where candidates put in zero academic effort. Note that
Vi/ci is the maximum academic effort at which student i’s
valuation from admission to the college is non-negative.
Hence no candidate would exert academic effort higher
than Vi/ci. If the college implements  ≥ VP/cP, the candi-
date from the privileged background would never choose
effort of VP/cP since even if his rival had zero effort the privi-
leged student would either lose for sure (if  > VP/cP) or lose
with probability 1/2 (if  = VP/cP). In either case he would
have a negative expected payoff and hence would choose
effort eP = 0. Therefore the preferred student can guaran-
tee admission with zero effort. Thus in equilibrium, with
such an extreme preferential treatment admissions policy
neither candidate exerts any effort. Likewise if  ≤ −VD/cD,
neither candidate exerts any effort and the place goes to
the applicant from the privileged background.
However if  ∈ (− VD/cD, VP/cP) equilibrium exists only
in mixed strategies. For the unfavored applicant, the best
response to effort of e′ by the favored applicant is either
to put | | more effort than his rival or to drop out of the
race altogether, so ef = e′ would not be optimal. In the all-
pay auction model of Konrad (2002),  the bidder with the
head-start advantage (the favored student in our frame-
work) always captures the advantageous position in the
competition and has a positive expected value from the
contest. The bidder without the head-start advantage has
an expected value of zero. However when students have
different value-to-cost ratios this is not always the case.
Depending on the intensity of the preferential treatment
it may  be either Candidate f or Candidate u who captures
the advantageous position. Hence we  need to study the
equilibrium in two  separate cases.
11 For instance, Canadian universities implement a background-blind
admissions policy where students simply submit their test scores.
12 Espenshade et al. (2004) estimates that at three highly selective
private research universities in the United States, during 1980s the prefer-
ence for legacy candidates was worth 160 points (on a scale of 1600). The
college may  implement preferential treatment in favor of legacy candi-
dates, as well as affirmative action. Li and Weisman (2011) explores some
implications of eliminating affirmative action in such environments.
of Educa
The unfavored student is admitted only if the score of the
favored student is at least | | points less than the score of
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Using standard methods as in Hillman and Riley
(1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996),  the
Lemma  below characterizes the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium for  ∈ (− VD/cD, VP/cP) where Ff(ef) and Fu(eu) denote
the unique equilibrium cumulative distribution functions
for academic effort of Candidate f and Candidate u,
respectively.
Lemma.
(i) If the admissions policy favors the applicant from the priv-
ileged background or if the policy “strongly favors” the
applicant from the deprived background,  ∈ (− VD/cD, 0)
or  ∈ (VP/cP − VD/cD, Vp/cp), the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies only and it is characterized by unique cumu-
lative density functions for the students’ effort which are
given by:
Ff (e) =
⎧⎨
⎩
cu
Vu
(e + | |) ∀e ∈
[
0,
Vu
cu
− | |
]
1 ∀e > Vu
cu
− | |
Fu(e) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Vf − cf Vu/cu + cf | |
Vf
∀e ∈ [0, | |]
Vf − cf Vu/cu + cf e
Vf
∀e ∈
(
| |, Vu
cu
]
1 ∀e > Vu
cu
(ii) If the admissions policy “mildly favors” the applicant from
the deprived background.  ∈ [0, VP/cP − VD/cD], the equi-
librium is in mixed strategies only and it is characterized
by unique cumulative density functions for the students’
effort which are given by:
Ff (e) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Vu − cuVf /cf + cue
Vu
∀e ∈
[
0,
Vf
cf
]
1 ∀e > Vf
cf
Fu(e) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 ∀e ∈ [0,  | |]
cf
Vf
(e − | |) ∀e ∈
(
| |, Vf
cf
+ | |
]
1 ∀e > Vf
cf
+ | |
The proof is in the Appendix A.
In the Lemma part (i), the favored applicant captures
the advantageous position. Either the favored applicant
comes from a privileged background and enjoys a higher
value-to-cost ratio or the favored applicant comes from a
deprived background but the degree of preferential treat-
ment is so strong that it overwhelms the value-to-cost
ratio advantage of his competitor. In either case, in equilib-
rium Candidate f can ensure admission if he exerts effort
equal to ef = (Vu/cu − | |)+ since Candidate u never exerts
more effort than Vu/cu. This allows Candidate f to enjoy
a positive expected payoff from the competition equal to
Vf − (Vu/cu)cf + cf| | > 0 and drives down the expected value
of Candidate u to zero.
In the Lemma  part (ii), the unfavored candidate captures
the advantageous position. The admissions policy “mildlytion Review 31 (2012) 123– 130
favors” the deprived candidate, but the degree of preferen-
tial treatment is not strong enough to overcome the value-
to-cost ratio advantage of the candidate from the privileged
background. In equilibrium while the deprived candidate
who  is subject to mild affirmative action never exerts more
academic effort than Vf/cf, the candidate from the privi-
leged background does not need to put effort greater than
Vf/cf + | | to guarantee admissions. Candidate u captures a
positive expected payoff of Vu − (Vf/cf)cu − cu| | > 0 and the
expected payoff of Candidate f is driven to zero.
Candidate u never puts positive probability on exerting
effort in the range (0, | |] since in order to be admitted u
needs to exceed f’s score at least by | |. Note that in case (i)
of the Lemma, there is a positive probability that Candidate
u simply chooses not to put in any effort (the probability
mass at zero) due to his dim prospects. This probability
is increasing in the degree of preferential treatment. The
probability that the favored applicant faces a very weak
competitor allows Candidate f to relax and so he also has
a probability mass at zero effort. However due to prefer-
ential treatment f has a positive chance of acceptance even
when he puts in no effort. This is not true for the unfa-
vored candidate. In case (ii) of the Lemma  f is the candidate
with dim prospects. He comes from a deprived background
and the affirmative action is not strong enough to turn the
tables. There is a positive probability that he may  exert no
academic effort for his admissions test. But the candidate
from the privileged background does not relax. With prob-
ability 1, he puts in positive effort in order to overcome the
preferential treatment.
2.4. The equilibrium admissions policy
In the first stage of the game the college chooses its opti-
mal  admissions rule to maximize the academic achieve-
ment of the incoming class. Note that there is strategic
interaction between the college and the candidates. The
admissions policy affects the students’ incentives to put
in effort and the college takes this into account via back-
ward induction when announcing its admissions policy.13
The college never implements a preferential treatment rule
that is so strong that it results in neither student putting in
any effort,  ≥ VP/cP or  ≤ −VD/cD. Below we consider the
admissions policies that result in competition between the
applicants,  ∈ (− VD/cD, VP/cP).
Since the Lemma  implies that ties where qD + | | = qP
occur with zero probability, the expected academic quality
of the admitted student (Q) is given by:
Q =
∫
u
xfu(x)Ff (x − | |)dx +
∫
f
xff (x)Fu(x + | |)dx (1)13 Empirical work by Long (2004), Dickson (2006), Andrews, Ranchhod,
and Sathy (2010) and Furstenberg (2010) using the changes in policy in
California, Texas and Florida, show that a college’s choice of affirmative
action does affect its applicant pool. Cortes (2010) shows that it can also
affect student retention and graduation rates.
of Education Review 31 (2012) 123– 130 127
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core of Candidate u if admitted. The second term gives the
xpected score of the Candidate f if admitted.
If  ∈ [0, VP/cP − VD/cD], then from the Lemma,
 =
∫ | |+Vf /cf
| |+
x
cucf
VuVf
(
Vu
cu
− Vf
cf
+ x − | |
)
dx
+
∫ Vf /cf
0
x2
cucf
VuVf
dx (2)
nd Leibniz’s rule yields:
∂Q
∂| | =
cu
2Vu
(
2
Vu
cu
− Vf
cf
)
= cA
2VA
(
2
VP
cP
− VD
cD
)
> 0 (3)
o the academic quality of the admitted student is increas-
ng in | | in this range.
If  ∈ (− VD/cD, 0) or  ∈ (VP/cP − VD/cD, VP/cP), then from
he Lemma,
 =
∫ Vu/cu
| |+
x2
cf cu
Vf Vu
dx +
∫ −| |+Vu/cu
0
x
cf cu
Vf Vu
×
(
Vf
cf
− Vu
cu
+ | | + x
)
dx (4)
nd Leibniz’s rule yields:
∂Q
∂| | =
cucf
VuVf
{
−| |2 + 1
2
(
Vu
cu
− | |
)
×
[(
Vu
cu
− Vf
cf
− | |
)
− Vf
cf
]}
< 0 (5)
o see the sign of (5) note that if  < 0 then Vu/cu < Vf/cf and
f  > VP/cP − VD/cD then Vu/cu − Vf/cf >  . In these ranges of
 the expected academic quality of the admitted student is
trictly decreasing in | |. Since the equilibrium distribution
unctions are continuous in  , so is the expected academic
uality of the admitted student. Hence the expected aca-
emic quality of the admitted student is maximized at
he top of the range where the admissions rule mildly
refers the applicant from the deprived background,  =
P/cP − VD/cD ≡ ̂ . Note that at ̂ the playing field is level
n the sense that both candidates have the same expected
alue from the competition equal to zero.
roposition 1. A purely academic-quality oriented college
dopts a background-sighted preferential treatment admis-
ions rule with ̂ = VP/cP − VD/cD which uniquely maximizes
he expected academic quality of the incoming class.
Rather than implementing a background-blind admis-
ions policy and simply admitting the student with the
ighest test score, it is optimal for the college to handicap
he student from the privileged background.14 To grasp the
ntuition of this proposition consider the incentive effects
f the preferential treatment on the two types of applicants.
ig. 1 graphs the expected test scores of the candidates
rom privileged and deprived socioeconomic backgrounds
14 Che and Gale (2003) and Fain (2009) have results with a similar flavor
n  the labor market, where the firm handicaps the more efficient worker.
n  these papers the contest designer’s objective is to maximize the totalFig. 1. Expected test scores.
as a function of the preferential treatment parameter for
all  ∈ (− VD/cD, VP/CP).
If the admissions policy favors the applicant from the
privileged background, f = P so  ∈ (− VD/cD, 0) or if the pol-
icy strongly favors the applicant from the deprived back-
ground, f = D and  ∈ (VP/cP − VD/cD, VP/cP), the expected
academic achievement of the favored applicant is given by:
∫ Vu/cu−| |
0
xff (x)dx =
∫ Vu/cu−| |
0
xcu
Vu
dx = cu
2Vu
(
Vu
cu
− | |
)2
(6)
while the expected academic achievement of the unfavored
applicant is given by:
∫ Vu/cu
| |+
xfu(x)dx =
∫ Vu/cu
| |+
cf x
Vf
dx = cf
2Vf
[(
Vu
cu
)2
− | |2
]
(7)
Both of these expressions are strictly decreasing in | |. In
these ranges of  , increasing the preferential treatment
tilts the playing field further in favor of Candidate f who
already has the advantageous position in the competition.
This induces Candidate u to become less aggressive. In
return Candidate f also puts less effort. Hence if the
college favors the candidate from the privileged back-
ground or strongly favors the candidate from the deprived
background, the expected academic achievement of stu-
dents from both backgrounds deteriorates with stronger
preferential treatment.
However the situation is different if the admissions
policy mildly favors the candidate from the deprived back-
ground. Then the expected academic achievement of the
applicant from the privileged background is given by:∫ | |+Vf /cf
| |+
xfu(x)dx =
∫ | |+Vf /cf
| |+
cf x
Vf
dx = Vf
2cf
+ | | (8)
where f = D and u = P. This is increasing in | | as the candi-
date from the privileged background has an incentive to put
in more effort in order to compensate for the preferential
treatment admissions rule.
effort, rather than the quality of the winner (the expected effort of the
incoming student in our framework).
of Education Review 31 (2012) 123– 130
^-vD/cD vP/cP0
½
/
1
2 /
V c
V c−
1
Favor
Privileged
Student
Mildly Favor
Deprived
Student
Strongly Favor
 Deprived
Student
ProbP
γγ
̂ = VP/cP − VD/cD result in the same percentage of privi-
leged students being admitted which is higher than their
representation in the applicant pool.16
15 For instance, Trinity College in Dublin admits a percentage of stu-
dents from the Republic of Ireland and from Northern Ireland equal to
the  percentage of applicants from each group. We leave it to the reader
to  determine which group is from the deprived background. In India,
higher educational state institutions reserve seats for members of sched-
uled caste and scheduled tribes. The percentages of reserved seats are
determined by the approximate proportions of these groups in the state128 I. Pastine, T. Pastine / Economics 
The expected academic achievement of the favored
applicant is given by:
∫ Vf /cf
0
xff (x)dx =
∫ Vf /cf
0
cux
Vu
dx = cu
2Vu
(
Vf
cf
)2
(9)
Note that this does not depend on  . If the admissions rule
mildly favors the candidate from the deprived socioeco-
nomic background, his effort distribution is independent
of the preferential treatment parameter (see the Lemma,
part ii). However, preferential treatment shifts the effort
distribution of the privileged candidate to the right by the
amount of the bonus added to the other candidate’s score.
Mild preferential treatment in favor of the applicant from
the deprived background induces the privileged student to
study more aggressively, yet fails to incentivize the student
from the deprived background.
This result is different from Fu (2006) which finds
that the expected effort of the student from the deprived
background improves when subject to mild multiplicative
affirmative action. Multiplicative preferential treatment
augments the marginal benefit of effort for the applicant
from the deprived background. However, with additive
preferential treatment, as is often implemented in practice,
the bonus points are added irrespective of the performance
of the student. Hence the student from the deprived back-
ground does not have an additional incentive to put in
effort.
The level of preferential treatment that maximizes the
expected academic quality of the incoming class ̂ also
maximizes the expected effort of the applicant from the
privileged background.
However at ̂ the expected academic effort of the appli-
cant from the deprived background is the same as under
a background-blind admissions policy. Hence the optimal
preferential treatment rule is able to provide the highest
caliber incoming class due entirely to its positive incentive
effect on the candidate from the privileged background.
3. Student-body diversity and the score gap
In this section, we evaluate the effects of the opti-
mal  admissions rule on student-body diversity and the
intergroup test score gap. Student-body diversity is often
considered a goal of affirmative action policies. It is argued
that diversity itself may  have social and educational ben-
efits. For example, an environment where people from
diverse backgrounds live and work together may  create
opportunities for them to get to know one another and to
develop understanding and mutual respect. Furthermore
balanced representation of people from different back-
grounds in higher education may  create the sense that
upward mobility is possible. These potential benefits are
outside of the model. It is nevertheless useful to consider
the implications of the equilibrium background-sighted
admissions policy on student-body diversity.
Full student-body diversification is achieved when the
ratio of admitted students from deprived backgrounds to
students from privileged backgrounds is equal to the ratioFig. 2. Admissions probability of the applicant from the privileged back-
ground.
of two types of students in the applicant pool.15 Hence in
this model full diversification occurs with a fifty percent
acceptance probability for each applicant.
One might presume that the mild affirmative action
implemented to maximize the academic quality of the
incoming class would also increase student-body diversity.
However in equilibrium, with mild additive preferential
treatment the student from the deprived background is not
more likely to gain admissions than with a background-
blind admissions policy. Below we derive the probability
that the privileged candidate is admitted, ProbP. Fig. 2
graphs ProbP as a function of  .
If the admissions rule implements mild preferential
treatment  ∈ [0, VP/cp − VD/cD], u = P and f = D, then the
probability that the privileged candidate is admitted is
given by:
ProbP =
∫ | |+VD/cD
| |+
fP(x)FD(x − | |)dx = 1 −
VD/cD
2VP/cP
>
1
2
(10)
Note that in this range of  , the probability of admis-
sion does not depend on  since the greater effort
of the applicant from the privileged background sim-
ply offsets the preferential treatment. Mild preferential
treatment has no effect on the diversity of the student
body. Both a group-blind admissions policy  = 0 and
the equilibrium preferential treatment admissions policy,population (see Weisskopf, 2004). These systems aim at achieving full
diversification through setting quotas rather than implementing prefer-
ential treatment through a bonus point system. See Hickman (2010) for a
discussion of the differences between the two systems.
16 Following the ban on the use of affirmative action in public colleges in
California and Texas, Card and Krueger (2005) document that the minor-
ity share of freshmen in Berkeley fell from 22% in 1997 to 12% in 1998
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roposition 2. At the level of preferential treatment that
aximizes the academic quality of the incoming class ̂ , stu-
ents from the privileged background are over represented in
he incoming class relative to the applicant pool, ProbP > 1/2.
ven though students from the deprived background are
ubject to favorable preferential treatment of ̂ > 0 their
robability of acceptance is the same as under a background-
lind admissions rule,  = 0.
With a multiplicative affirmative action rule Fu (2006)
nds that the academic quality maximizing choice of
dmissions policy yields full student-body diversification
s a byproduct. Hence there is no tension between aca-
emic quality and diversity. This is not the case with an
dditive preferential treatment policy. The student body is
ully diversified only if the college implements strong pref-
rential treatment in favor of the student from the deprived
ackground.
If the admissions policy strongly favors the applicant
rom the deprived background,  ∈ (VP/cP − VD/cD, VP/cP)
hen the probability that the unfavored applicant, u = P, is
dmitted given by:
robP =
∫ VP /cP
| |+
FD(x − | |)fP(x)dx
=
∫ VP /cP
| |+
(
cPx
VP
)
cD
VD
dx = cPcD
2VPVD
[(
VP
cP
)2
− | |2
]
(11)
ote that in this range of  the probability that the candi-
ate from the privileged background is admitted decreases
ith | |.17 From Eq. (11), the student body is fully diver-
ified, i.e. ProbP = 1/2, when the college implements strong
referential treatment ̃ = [(VP/cP)(VP/cP − VD/cD)]1/2 in
avor of the candidate from the deprived background.
roposition 3. The level of preferential treatment
hat yields full student-body diversity is given by
˜  = [(VP/cP)(VP/cP − VD/cD)]1/2. This level of preferen-
ial treatment is strictly higher than the level of preferential
reatment that maximizes the academic quality of the
ncoming class, ̃ > ̂ > 0.
nd at Texas A&M with the introduction of mandated color-blind admis-
ions the minority share of entering freshmen fell from 20% in 1995 to
2% in 1997. If previously these institutions were maximizing the aca-
emic quality of the incoming class via preferential treatment admissions
olicies, the model would have predicted no change in the minority share
f  the incoming class when the admissions policy was  forced to be color-
lind. Hence the model implies that these institutions were implementing
trong preferential treatment implicitly targeting diversity.
17 If the college favors the student from the privileged background
 ∈ (− VD/cD , 0), the probability that the deprived candidate is admitted
s  given by:
robD =
∫ VD/cD
| |+
FP (x − | |)fD(x)dx
=
∫ VD/cD
| |+
(
cDx
VD
)
cP
VP
dx = cDcP
2VDVP
[(
VD
cD
)2
− | |2
]
hich is identical to Eq. (11) except subscripts P and D exchanged since
n  this case the unfavored candidate is u = D. So ProbD decreases with | |.tion Review 31 (2012) 123– 130 129
Hence with additive preferential treatment admissions
policy, there is a trade off between academic excellence and
student-body diversity.
In addition to student-body diversity, the intergroup
score gap is frequently considered a key metric of the effect
of admissions policies. If the admitted students are more
polarized in quality based on their group affiliation, we are
more likely to observe statistical discrimination in the post-
college job market. Justice Thomas argues that such Phelps
(1972) style discrimination is likely to be exacerbated by
affirmative action in the admissions process. “[E]ither racial
discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may
be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which
case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks
who would succeed without discrimination”.18
Now consider the effect of the optimal admissions rule
on the score gap of the admitted students compared to the
case with no preferential treatment.
If  ∈
[
0, VP/cP − VD/cD
]
, then f = D and the expected
achievement of an admitted student from a deprived back-
ground (QD) is given by:
QD =
1
1 − ProbP
∫
D
xfD(x)FP(x + | |)dx
= 1
1 − ProbP
∫ VD/cD
0
cPcD
VPVD
x2dx (12)
Since ProbP is given by (10) and does not depend on  , QD
does not depend on  .
The expected achievement of an admitted student from
the privileged background (QP) is given by:
QP =
1
ProbP
∫
P
xfP(x)FD(x − | |)dx =
1
ProbP
∫ | |+VD/cD
| |+
× x cD
VD
[
VP − (cP/cD)VD − cP | | + cPx
VP
]
dx (13)
Since ProbP does not depend on  , Leibniz’s rule yields:
∂QP
∂| | =
cPcD
2VPVD ProbP
×
[
2
(
VP
cP
− VD
cD
− | |
)
VD
cD
+
(
VD
cD
+ | |
)2
− | |2
]
(14)
Substituting in ProbP from (10), ∂QP/∂| | = 1. Hence the
score gap (QP − QD) is higher at ̂ compared with the gap at
 = 0.
Proposition 4. Compared with a background-blind admis-
sions policy where  = 0, the score gap is wider with the
preferential treatment admissions rule ̂ where the academic
quality of the incoming class is maximized.
While an academic-quality oriented college imple-
ments affirmative action in admissions, this policy does
not alter student-body diversity and has the byproduct of
increasing the intergroup score gap.
18 Grutter v. Bollinger (02-241) 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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4. Conclusion
Student-body diversity is commonly cited as the
motivation for affirmative action in college admissions.
However the college may  choose to implement affirma-
tive action even if it is purely academic-quality oriented.
The optimal academic excellence admissions policy gives
preferential treatment in favor of students from a deprived
socioeconomic background in order to maximize competi-
tion between potential applicants.
Fu (2006) analyzes multiplicative affirmative action
where the academic achievement score of the applicant
from a deprived background is multiplied by a scalar
greater than 1. With multiplicative preferential treatment a
college maximizing academic quality achieves full student-
body diversity as a byproduct because a multiplicative
affirmative action policy creates an additional incentive for
students from a deprived background to put in effort.
However often affirmative action admissions policies
take, or are perceived to take, an additive form where
the college augments the test score of the student from a
deprived socioeconomic background by a fixed number of
points. We  show that the exact form of affirmative action
policy matters for student incentives and student-body
diversity in equilibrium.
With an additive form of preferential treatment admis-
sions policy, the level of preferential treatment that
maximizes the academic quality of the incoming class does
not produce full student-body diversity. In fact it does not
yield any improvement in student-body diversity com-
pared with a background-blind admissions policy. It fails
to incentivize students from deprived backgrounds since
the bonus is added to their score irrespective of their effort.
But it induces students from privileged backgrounds to put
in more effort to overcome the preferential treatment. In
equilibrium, the affirmative action has no effect on the
representation of deprived students in the incoming class.
Furthermore it results in a higher score gap between admit-
ted students from different groups, which may  exacerbate
statistical discrimination in the post-college job market.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article
can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/
j.econedurev.2011.09.005.
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